If you find a security issue in this module, please do not file a public GitHub issue. Instead, email the maintainer directly:
Include:
- A description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- The Magento version, PHP version, and module version affected
- Any proof-of-concept code (if applicable)
We aim to acknowledge reports within 48 hours and to provide a fix or mitigation plan within 7 days for confirmed issues.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 4.0.x | Yes |
| 3.0.x | Critical fixes only until 2027-06-01 |
| 2.0.x | Critical fixes only until 2027-06-01 |
| < 2.0 | No |
This module:
-
Reads from
ScopeConfig(admin-controlled values) and sanitises every value again at render time, because config can be written without passing a backend model (direct DB write,app/etc/config.php, env override). -
Writes the response body of
Magento\Robots\Model\Robots::getData()via a plugin. It does not write to the database or the filesystem. -
Does not accept input from frontend visitors.
-
Makes outbound HTTP requests. This was not true before 3.0.0 and the previous version of this document still said so. The module fetches:
- the store's own
/robots.txt(admin Validate/Preview,angeo:robots:validate,angeo:robots:preview); - vendor-published bot IP range lists, e.g.
https://openai.com/gptbot.json(angeo:robots:verify-bot-ip); - Web Bot Auth key directories at
<origin>/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory(angeo:robots:verify-bot-request).
All of them go through
Model\UrlFetcher, under one policy:http/httpsonly (scheme allow-list plusCURLOPT_PROTOCOLS);- redirects are never followed by libcurl — each hop is validated manually,
must stay on the original host (a leading
www.aside), must not downgrade HTTPS to HTTP, max 3 hops; - every hop's host is resolved and each address checked by
Model\Http\IpGuard; loopback, RFC 1918, link-local (including the169.254.169.254metadata endpoint), CGNAT, multicast and reserved ranges are refused, IPv6 and IPv4-mapped forms included; - the validated address is pinned with
CURLOPT_RESOLVE, so the host cannot resolve to something else between the check and the connection; - responses are capped at 1 MiB and the parser stops after 50,000 lines.
- the store's own
Api\BotVerificationInterface answers "is this request really from that
vendor?" — it never blocks anything. Blocking belongs at the WAF or CDN, where
it happens before PHP is reached.
The Web Bot Auth verifier fetches keys only from an origin that appears in the
bot catalogue or in angeo_robots_txt_aeo/verification/trusted_signature_agents.
It never takes the origin from the Signature-Agent header alone: that value is
attacker-controlled, fetching it would be an SSRF primitive, and a signature
verified against an attacker's own key set would "prove" whatever they wanted.
A signature is only accepted when it covers @authority and the
signature-agent header — otherwise a valid signature captured elsewhere could
be replayed against this store.
- Admin users are trusted to configure paths and custom content. If you do not
trust your admin users, do not grant them
Angeo_RobotsTxtAeo::config. The render-time sanitiser is defence in depth, not a privilege boundary. - TLS verification is on by default for all outbound calls. The
--insecureCLI flag exists solely for local development with self-signed certificates and must not be used in production. - Verification results are advisory. A
verifiedresult proves the signature or the source address; it does not tell you the request is welcome.
High signal:
- Remote code execution
- Stored XSS in the admin panel
- Path traversal in bot override fields
- Cache poisoning of the served robots.txt
- ACL bypass
- Any way to make the module emit a directive the operator did not configure
- Any way to make the verifier report
verifiedfor a request that was not signed by the vendor, or to make it fetch a key directory from an untrusted origin - SSRF: reaching an internal address through any of the fetch paths above
Out of scope:
- Self-XSS where an admin pastes JavaScript into a config field
- DoS via extreme config values within the documented caps — that is a legitimate admin choice
- A vendor publishing an inaccurate IP range list or key directory
Reporters of valid issues will be credited in the changelog unless they request anonymity.