[openargus]

…put server

ArgusCheckClientMessage()'s RADIUM_FILE command handler let any client connected to a running radium (or 'argus -B') output server request an arbitrary local file by sending 'FILE:' over the client connection. The path came directly from client-supplied network input ("char *file = &ptr[6];") with no validation, and was passed unmodified into ArgusSendFile(), which stat()s and fopen()s it and streams its contents back to the client -- readable by whatever user the server process runs as, with no authentication check gating this command and no restriction on which paths could be requested.

Rather than build out proper access control (an opt-in configuration option, path allow-listing, and/or requiring an authenticated session) for a feature with no currently known caller relying on it, this command is disabled outright:

• ArgusClientCommands[RADIUM_FILE] (the "FILE:" string radium matches incoming client messages against) is set to NULL, so the command- matching loop's own "ArgusClientCommands[i] != NULL" guard skips it entirely -- a client sending "FILE:..." now falls through to the generic unrecognized-command log path.
• The RADIUM_FILE case body (the call into ArgusSendFile()) is also commented out, so restoring the NULL entry alone would not be sufficient to re-enable this behavior; a deliberate code change is required.

ArgusSendFile() itself and its declaration are left in place, unused, since it is not otherwise reachable and removing it is out of scope for this fix.

Verified via clean rebuild (0 errors), and a normal radium/ra end-to-end regression test: radium serving a real argus data file (derived from the RIMPAC baseline pcap) over a local TCP listener, with an ra client connecting and successfully receiving the MAR status header, confirming the ordinary client START/connection lifecycle is unaffected by this change. The standard RIMPAC-pcap smoke test (bin/ra -r ... -c ',') also confirmed unaffected (1825 records, unchanged). No FILE: exploitation attempt was made against the pre-fix binary; the defect (unauthenticated arbitrary local file read via a documented command dispatch table) is unambiguous from static inspection alone.